In this paper I formulate a continuous time and continuous space version of Harris and Vickers (1987) Racing Under Uncertainty with potentially asymmetric players. To prove the existence and uniqueness of the equilibria, I use a boundary value problem formulation which is novel to the dynamic competition literature. In some cases, I obtain closed-form solutions of the equilibria in which equilibrium strategies exhibit the discouragement e¤ ect similar to the one in the original paper.
Introduction
A race is a contest between two or more competitors who exert e¤ort to win a prize. Sport contests, such as bicycle races, golf tournaments and basketball championships, are the most popular forms of races. Races studied in economic theory include patent races and contests for job promotion. Despite its importance, the theoretical literature on dynamic competition has been relatively sparse. Harris and Vickers (1987) is a pioneering paper with a model in discrete state-space. In their model, they prove that at least one equilibrium exists and characterize some of its properties. However, they only prove the uniqueness of the symmetric equilibria and they do not allow for discounting. This paper introduces a continuous time, continuous state-space model based on Harris and Vickers (1987) 's tug-of-war to address the question of the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. The existence and uniqueness theorems apply for some cases with asymmetric players and discounting.
In this model, two players compete for a …nal reward. The reward is won by the …rst player who achieves a given distance over his rival. At any moment when the race is going on, each player puts in e¤ort which in ‡uences the distance between him and his rival: a Brownian motion with a drift that depends on the e¤orts of the players. The cost of e¤ort functions are strictly convex. I consider the set of Markovian Perfect Equilibria (MPEs) in which equilibrium strategies of the players are conditioned only on the current distance between them. I prove the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium MPE strategies under some weak conditions on the cost functions and …nal rewards. In some special cases, the continuous time framework delivers a closed-form solution of MPEs which facilitates the characterization of equilibrium strategies 1 . The equilibrium strategies share basic properties with the equilibrium strategies in the discrete state space model in Harris and Vickers (1987) . As in the latter, the Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) strategies exhibit a discouragement e¤ect: The players exert high e¤ort only when they are close to each other. When a player is left further behind by his rival, he reduces his e¤ort given his slim chance of winning. The rival who gets further ahead therefore faces less competition and can safely reduce his e¤ort. A larger distance between the two players thus discourages both players. Harris and Vickers (1987) however show the discouragement e¤ect only for the case in which two players have the same cost function and they do not discount the future. In contrast, I use the theory of boundary value problems for systems of second-order di¤erential equations developed in Hartman (1964) ; this theory allows me to consider the model an show the discouragement e¤ect in full generality with potentially asymmetric players and with discounting. Moscarini and Smith (2007) is the …rst paper to address the optimal design of the race in a similar continuous time, continuous state-space model. Moscarini and Smith take a different approach to solving the model, relying on the symmetry of Markov Perfect Equilibria. Besides restricting their attention to symmetric equilibria, the authors consider only the case of no discounting. Budd, Harris, and Vickers (1993) also solve a similar model using boundary value representations. Their method only applies when the discount rate r goes to in…nity. Another continuous time continuous state-space version of the Harris and Vickers model is developed in Horner (1999) . He restricts the action space to be …nite, allowing for only two levels of e¤ort. Hence, the MPE strategies are such that players switch their actions only infrequently based on some threshold rule.
In the next section, I present the model. In Section 3, I prove the existence and uniqueness of MPEs with general cost functions under some weak restrictions, both with and without discounting. In Section 4, I study the properties of equilibrium strategies including the discouragement e¤ect. I also illustrate these properties for the case of quadratic cost functions. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
Two players, A and B, engage in a contest for a …nal reward in continuous time. At each moment, each player chooses an e¤ort, x A for player A which costs him c A (x A ) and x B for player B which costs him c B (x B ). In Harris and Vickers (1987) , A and B are two research …rms competing for an exclusive patent. The e¤ort can then be interpreted as money spent on laboratories, equipment, researchers, etc. The players discount future costs and rewards at (potentially di¤erent) rates r i 0.
Let z 2 R denote the relative distance between the two players. The race starts at z = 0, and a player wins the race if he attains a certain lead over the other player: Player A wins the race with reward P A when he reaches his lead over B, z = K A > 0, and B wins the race with reward P B when he reaches his lead ( K B ) over A, i.e., z = K B < 0. Therefore, z is also the only payo¤ relevant state of the race.
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The uncertainty is incorporated in the temporal evolution of the state z t :
where W t is a standard Brownian motion and W 0 = 0. In order to ensure that in each moment the e¤ort choice of each player is a well-de…ned maximization problem with a unique solution, I impose the following standard assumption on the cost function of each player Assumption 1 The cost functions c i (x) are twice continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and strictly convex: c 0 i (x) > 0 and c 00 i (x) > 0 8x > 0 and i 2 fA; Bg. Moreover the players do not bear any cost if they do not exert e¤ort, c i (0) = 0 and the Inada conditions 2 In this model, the only payo¤ relevant state is the distance between the two players because the outcome of the race only depends on the distance. While this model might be a suitable description of some type of races such a race for job promotion or tie-breaks in tennis, it is not a good model for patent races in which a player wins if he achieves a certain discovery, not his progress relative to the other player. In Cao (2009) , I develop a model for this situation. The payo¤ relevant state is a vector of two numbers, distance of each player to a …nish line. However, that model is less tractable, and I can only solve it numerically. The equilibrium strategies in this race exhibits similar properties to the equilibrium strategies in this paper. Moreover, in discrete state spaces, Harris and Vickers (1987) conjecture and verify numerically that the tug-of-war race is a close approximation of the two dimension race. Similar conjecture holds for continuous state-space.
at 0 and 1 are satis…ed:
In addition, in order for the stochastic di¤erential equation (1) describing the evolution of the state variable z to have a solution, the e¤ort choices x i;t must be bounded. I will impose an explicit bound on the e¤ort choice of each player: 0 x i;t x. The following assumption guarantees that x can be chosen large enough so that it is never binding in equilibrium.
This assumption means that the marginal cost increases fast enough at high levels of e¤ort so that the players never want to exert too much e¤ort. It will be shown later in the appendix that x can be chosen as max (c
Such an M exists due to Assumption 2. 3 This assumption is satis…ed if c 00 i (x) are bounded below from 0 at in…nity; i.e., there exists an and an x > 0 such that c 00 i (x) > 8x > x : Geometric cost functions c i (x) = c i x k i with k i 2 satisfy this assumption, in particular quadratic cost functions satisfy this assumption since they have constant second derivatives.
If this assumption is not satis…ed, for example, in the extreme, when they are both linear, players will exert high e¤ort and might reach any upper bound on the e¤orts. I rule out this situation to avoid imposing any ad-hoc bound on e¤ort of the players. Horner (1999) is an example of races in which c i (:) are linear. In equilibrium, the players only choose between two levels of e¤ort which can be interpreted as the bounds that he imposes on the e¤orts of the players given the linearity of the cost functions. The equilibrium strategies are such that players switch their actions only infrequently based on some threshold rule. This structure of equilibria is thus very di¤erent from equilibria in my model.
Under the restrictions on the cost functions and the e¤ort choice of the players, the expected payo¤ functions of each player i following a optimal strategy X i = fx it g 1 t=0 given his rival's strategy X i = fx it g 1 t=0 is well-de…ned:
where is the …nish time of the race, i.e., the …rst time where either z t reaches K A ; player A wins the race, or z t reaches K B , player B wins the race. The indicator function indicates who wins the race. Notice that is a random variable depending on the uncertain evolution of the race; or more precisely, it is a stopping time. The race starts at z 0 2 (K B ; K A ). There are two components of the payo¤ functions. The …rst part is the discounted reward e r P i if player i wins the race, and the second part is the discounted cost of e¤ort, e rt c i (x it ), that player i continuously makes during the race. Each player chooses a strategy maximizing his expected payo¤ given his rival's strategy.
The problem now is to …nd the equilibrium strategy functions, (X A ; X B ) such that each player maximizes his expected payo¤ given his rival's strategy. It is well-known that the best response to a Markov strategy is a Markov strategy thus any MPE is a subgame perfect equilibrium. An analogy for continuous time games is that, if strategy x Bt is Markovian, i.e. function of z t only, then x At can be chosen from the class of Markovian strategies, and vice versa; therefore, I can restrict myself to cases where both strategies are Markovian.
I further restrict myself to the set of equilibria with twice di¤erentiable value functions in order to write the second derivatives. We can then obtain the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations using the dynamic programming principle:
At each moment, the e¤ort choice of each player involves the trade-o¤ between the current convex cost of e¤ort, c i (x) with higher chance of winning, taken the other player's strategy as given,(
. Each player also discounts the future payo¤, rJ i (z t ) ; and takes into account the uncertainty evolution of the state z; 2 2 J 00 i (z t ). The …rst order conditions from (4) determine the e¤ort levels of players as functions of the derivatives of their value functions:
where
Finally, the boundary conditions for J A and J B are
These boundary conditions are intuitive: when A is K A ahead of B; he wins the reward P A , B receives nothing and when B is K B ahead of A; he wins the reward P B , A receives nothing:
De…nition 1 A Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) is a pair of equilibrium payo¤ functions (J A (z) ; J B (z)) satisfying the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations (4) and the boundary conditions (7) and a pair of equilibrium strategies (x A (z) ; x B (z)) given by (5).
The task of …nding MPE strategies becomes solving a second-order boundary value problem on (J A (z) ; J B (z)). We …rst solve the e¤ort choice given the incentive J 0 i (z) as in (5).Then, by plugging the e¤ort choice into (4), we can re-write the Hamilton-JacobiBellman equations as an explicit second-order boundary value problem:
with the boundary conditions (7) and where
Rewriting the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations as a boundary value problem allows me to use the theory of boundary value for systems of second order di¤erential equation developed in Hartman (1964) . Using this system, some preliminary properties of the payo¤ functions can be shown. First, the payo¤ functions are strictly positive except at the two boundaries. This is because, whenever the race is not yet concluded, a player can choose to stay in the race and to exert no e¤ort, but he still has a positive probability of winning due to the uncertain evolution of the state z. Second, the closer a player is to his goal, the higher his expected payo¤ is because he has more chance of winning. Hence, the slope of the payo¤ function, which is the incentive determining the e¤ort level of each player, is strictly positive in absolute value. So (6) implies that each player will exert a strictly positive e¤ort at any moment of the race, that is, x i (z) > 0 8z and i 2 fA; Bg.
Lemma 1 A solution of the payo¤ functions (J A ; J B ) to the system (8) satis…es 1. Strict positivity of the payo¤ functions:
Given the option to exert no e¤ort, and the Brownian evolution of the distance between the two players, each player has a strictly positive probability of winning the race without incurring any cost of e¤ort; their payo¤ functions are thus strictly positive whenever the race is not yet concluded.
Strict positivity of incentives:
As each player moves closer to his goal, he has a higher probability of winning the race, therefore, his payo¤ is higher. Since the incentives are strictly positive, the players always exert a strictly positive level of e¤ort.
Proof. In the Appendix, using the Gronwall's Inequality.
Existence and Uniqueness of Markov Perfect Equilibrium
Before analyzing the equilibrium strategies and outcomes of the race, it is important to prove the existence of Markov Perfect Equilibria and their uniqueness, or equivalently the existence and uniqueness of the solution to the boundary value problem (8). The steps of the existence and uniqueness proof are in the Appendix.
Theorem 1 A Markov equilibrium exists.
Proof. In the Appendix. It is enough to show that the boundary value problem (8) has at least one solution As in other economic models, it is more di¢ cult to ensure the uniqueness of equilibria. As a result, an extra condition, in addition to Assumption 2 on the cost of e¤ort functions, is required to ensure the uniqueness of the MPE. 
where M is determined in (2).
Proof. In the Appendix. Notice that the left hand side of (10) is strictly increasing in M and the (2) implies that M is increasing in max (P A ; P B ), so the solution is unique if max (P A ; P B ) is relatively small, the discount factor is relatively high or the degree of uncertainty, , is relatively large. Finally, as in Harris and Vickers (1987) , the race is more likely to admit a unique equilibrium if the cost function is su¢ ciently convex, i.e., is su¢ ciently large.
The Discouragement E¤ect
The previous section establishes the general existence and uniqueness of the MPE. In this section, I investigate some properties of the MPE strategies. A striking property is that higher distance between the leader and the follower discourages both from exerting e¤ort, which is often mentioned as the discouragement e¤ect. This e¤ect leads to an ambiguous e¤ect of incentives, such as the e¤ect of higher …nal reward to the winner of the race on the total expected e¤ort of the players. Moscarini and Smith (2007) show that a higher …nal reward does not necessarily increase the total expected e¤ort of the players. In Cao (2009), I show that also due to this discouragement e¤ect, handicapping the advantaged player might counter-intuitively reduce the expected completion time of the race.
In Subsection 4.1, I show the discouragement e¤ect for general cost functions. I illustrate this e¤ect with a special case of quadratic cost functions in Subsection 4.2 where I can …nd a closed form solution. The factors that a¤ect the intensity of this e¤ect are the …nal rewards, the amount of uncertainty, the level of the cost of e¤ort to the two players.
General cost functions
I …nd two properties of the MPE strategies which are similar to the discrete time MPE strategies in Harris and Vickers (1987) . First, the leader in the race puts in higher e¤orts than the follower does. Second, e¤orts of both players decrease as the gap between them increases. Other R&D competition models share the second property of MPE strategies. For instance, Aghion, Harris, Howitt, and Vickers (2001) and Acemoglu and Akcigit (2008) , both …nd that e¤ort is highest when …rms are technologically close to each other. The …rst property, however, does not hold in all models. For instance, the models of Acemoglu and Akcigit (2008) and Reinganum (1983) have the opposite property. In their model, there is an Arrow's replacement e¤ect, i.e., the leading …rm receives ‡ow pro…ts before successful new innovations, so it has relatively weaker incentive than the follower to stochastically shorten the random time to the next innovation. In contrast, in my model, players only receive reward at the end; the Arrow's replacement e¤ect is thus not present.
To formalize the discouragement e¤ect, I de…ne the pivot of the game, z , as where the two players exert the same e¤ort level, i.e. x A (z ) = x B (z ). If there does not exist such a z then either,
, we de…ne z = K A . So z always exists. In a symmetric equilibrium, as in Moscarini and Smith (2007) , z = 0: Harris and Vickers (1987) only prove the discouragement e¤ect for the case in which c A c B . In such a case, z can be de…ned equivalently as z = arg min
The following lemma shows that z is unique.
Proof. Appendix
Given this pivot z , we can say that, at a moment t, A is the leader of the race if he is relatively closer to his goal than B (the follower) is, that is, z t > z and vice versa when z t < z . Given the potential asymmetries between the two players, z does not necessarily correspond to the point
where the two players are at equal absolute distances from their goal, except for symmetric equilibria.
Lemma 2 then means that the leader always exerts higher e¤ort than the follower does. Also using the pivot, we can state the discouragement e¤ect in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose that z > z ;that is, player A is the leader and player B is the follower, then 1. The discouragement e¤ ect on the follower: The follower, player B, reduces his e¤ort as he gets further behind. That is, x B (z) is strictly decreasing in z.
2. The discouragement e¤ ect on the leader: Suppose r A = 0, once the leader, player A, starts slowing down at z, he will continue to do so at any e z > z. That is if
Proof. Appendix Let us take a closer look at the interaction between the players'impatience and strategic motives in their e¤ort choice. When a player is behind, the discouragement e¤ect and discounting both serve to lower e¤ort provision (part 1 of Proposition 1). However, when a player is su¢ ciently ahead, the strategic motivation reduces his incentive to provide greater e¤ort, whereas discounting operates in the opposite direction. Indeed, numerical analysis shows that when the leader's discount rate is su¢ ciently high, the impatience is strong enough to cancel the slowing down interval in which the leader reduces his e¤ort after getting further ahead from the follower. Consequently, part 2 of Proposition 1 requires the additional assumption that r A = 0.
4 We can also show that, if z is strictly interior, intially player A will increase his e¤ort, that is, x 0 A (z) > 0 for z close to z .
Example: Quadratic cost functions
Consider the case of quadratic cost and no discounting. I can solve the game in closed form. Moscarini and Smith (2007) obtain a closed-form identical to the one presented here for symmetric equilibria, up to an a¢ ine transformation. Their method relies on the symmetry of equilibria. My method to derived closed-form solutions covers asymmetric equilibria also.
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I also establish the equivalence between lower cost of e¤ort, lower uncertainty and higher …nal reward.
Let the cost of e¤ort functions be quadratic c i (x) =
x 2 2 i
. The higher i is, the less e¤ort costs to player i.
Lemma 3 The Markov equilibrium strategies
where (e x A (e z) ; e x B (e z)) is a Markov equilibrium of the game with parameters e A = e B = e = 1 and the rewards e
Proof. Appendix This lemma says that, holding everything else constant, a player would be indi¤erent between seeing its cost decreases from x 2 to x 2 0 and seeing the …nal reward augmented by 0 . Moreover, both players would be indi¤erent seeing the degree of uncertainty decreases from to 0 and seeing their …nal rewards augmented by 0 . The pair of the strategy functions is a solution to a vector-valued …rst-order boundary problem. The closed-form solution is derived in the Appendix in which show that we can implicitly solve for the e¤ort ratio of the e¤ort choices of the two players, g =
, as a function of the relative distance between them. In particular, g (z) is the solution to the following equation:
Since f (g) = g 1 g + 2 ln (g) is strictly increasing over the interval (0; +1) and
for each z there exists a unique g (z) satis…es (11):We have C 1 greater than 0, thus g (z) is increasing in z, i.e., a player exerts relatively higher e¤ort than his rival does when the former is closer to his goal. The "pivot" of the race then corresponds to z where g (z ) = 1. It follow immediately from the fact that g (z) is strictly increasing that the leader always exert higher e¤ort than the followers does. The discouragement e¤ects in Proposition 1, part1 and 2 also follow from the closed form solution of the strategy functions
Let z > z . For the follower, given g (z) is increasing in z and x B is strictly increasing in g if g > 1+k ; k > 0; however the …nal expressions are not as simple as the ones for quadratic cost functions. that g (z )= 2. So depending on whether g (K A ) > 2, i.e. on P i ; i , from expression (27) in the Appendix, the leader will start slowing down before the end of the race.
The higher the …nal reward, the stronger the discouragement e¤ect. When P A and P B are large, the two players will both exert high e¤ort only when they are close to each other, however when one player gets further ahead of his rival, he wants to reduce his e¤ort because the cost of e¤ort is too high to him. He can safely reduce his e¤ort since the continuous time, continuous state-space and perfect information features of the race allow him to commit to engage in a war phase with high e¤ort when his rival gets closer to him. Given this strategy, his rival also reduces e¤ort because of the smaller chance to win the race. As both P A , P B go to in…nity, both players only exert in…nitely high e¤ort over a in…nitely small distance to each other. As one of them takes the lead, the other reduces his e¤ort to almost 0, and the leader exerts an in…nitesimal e¤ort level as well.
Moreover, the equivalence result above shows that lower cost of e¤ort delivers the same equilibrium strategies as if the cost of e¤ort remains unchanged but the …nal rewards are higher. Thus, the lower the cost of e¤ort to the players, the stronger the discouragement e¤ect. Lower cost of e¤ort allows the players to sustain their strategy more cheaply.
Finally, also by the equivalence result, a lower uncertainty on the evolution of the state of the race, i.e. lower , corresponds to higher P A and P B , and thus a stronger discouragement e¤ect. Indeed, the equivalent strategies are the same as in the case of unit uncertainty = 1 and the …nal rewards are respectively e P A = P A 2 and e P B = P B 2 : In the limiting case when, there is no uncertainty, i.e., = 0, the disadvantaged player knows that the advantaged player will rationally outdo any e¤ort he makes. This credible threat discourages the weaker player from making any e¤ort. Fudenberg et al. (1983) and Harris and Vickers (1985) stress the same point.
Conclusion
In this paper, I develop a simple continuous time model of racing under uncertainty. I prove the existence of Markov Perfect Equilibria and, in some cases, also their uniqueness. The equilibria have similar properties to those in the original discrete time model. In addition, for some special cases, I can derive the closed-form of these MPE strategies, which facilitates the study of the comparative statics. In Cao (2009) , I use this closed-form solution to show that handicapping the advantaged player in a race might be useful. A future research direction is to develop a model with more realistic features of certain races, for example, allowing for more general cost functions, discounting, and for a …nish line instead of distance between players. Even though these models do not have closed-form MPEs, in Cao (2009) I show that it is still possible to numerically compute the equilibria, and examine their properties. Interestingly, the properties of the MPEs in these models are consistent with the results from the less general model.
Appendix
Derivation of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations. For example, for …rm A at time t; assume that it optimizes from t + t forward and solves
The …rst part of the last expression is the ‡ow of the cost of R&D e¤ort during a time interval of length t. The second part is the discounted continuation value after this time interval. The continuation value is discounted by the factor e r A t = 1 r A t + o ( t) ;where, from now on, o ( t) denotes second-order terms. This continuation value depends on the evolution of z t to z t+ t . By Ito's Lemma, we have:
Taking the expectations of both sides, and using the normal independent increments property of the Brownian noise, we have
Now, substitute these results into (13) and subtract J A (z t ) from both sides. Dividing all terms by t, and taking the limit as t ! 0, we obtain the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (4) for the value function of …rm A: We obtain similarly the Hamilton-JacobiBellman equation (4) for the value function of …rm B:
To prove Lemma 1, we will make use of the Gronwall's Inequality 6 in (Hartman 1964, pg. 24) . We can show that this yields a contradiction because J A would be identically 0 over [z ; K A ]. First of all, we have the following inequality:
where the inequalities is obtained from the three inequalities
Apply the Gronwall's inequality for jJ A (z)j 2 + jJ
This yields a contradiction with the fact that J A (K A ) = P A > 0. So we have J A (z) > 0 for all z 2 (K B ; K A ). The proof for J B (z) is analogous. 2) By the mean value theorem, there exists a z 0 2 (K B ; K A ) such that
If there exists some 
The extreme K B cannot be a maximum of J A over this interval. And in a neighborhood z = z " of z ,
so this extreme z cannot be a maximum over the interval, either. Thus, J A has an interior maximum in the interval. Denote this maximum z . We have J Again, by applying the Gronwall's inequality, we have J 0
and hence we have a contradiction. It follows that J 0
Steps of the proof of Theorem 1. The steps of the existence proof are the following. I will show that there exist constants P; M and a globally bounded vector-valued function g satisfying 1)8 jJ i j P; jJ
However, g can be di¤erent from the right hand side outside this region 2)Any solution to the boundary value problem
will satisfy jJ i (z)j P; jJ
K A ] Therefore, any solution to the boundary value problem (15) is also a solution to the original problem (8).
In order to prove the existence and the uniqueness of the solution to the boundary problem (8); we …rst provide a bound on the e¤ort intensity of each …rm.
Lemma 4 There exists some M depending only on P A ; P B ; K A ; K B and c (:
Substituting the e¤ort functions (6) into the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (8); we have:
By subtracting these two equalities, we obtain
where P = max (P A ; P B ) :This is due to the facts that
By the mean value theorem, there exists a z 2 (
. It then follows that
The last equality is a result of a change of integration variables from t to s = D 0 (t):
Thus, there exists an M such that
We conclude that
Using these bounds on J 0 A (z) and J 0 B (z) ; we now can prove the existence of a solution for any value of r i ; P i ; K i :
7 To this end, the following classical lemma from (G.Scorza-Dragoni 1935) will be useful:
Lemma Let g (t; x; x 0 ) be a continuous and bounded (vector-valued) function for 0 t T and arbitrary (x; x 0 ). Then, for arbitrary x 0 and x T the system of di¤erential equations
has at least one solution x = x (t) satisfying
It is been pointed out by Bass (1958) that this lemma is easily derived from the Schauder's …xed point theorem. In order to use this lemma, we need to transform the system (8) into a bounded system over
Proof of the Theorem 1. First, we can easily …nd two bounded, strictly increasing and in…nitely di¤erentiable functions '; such that
Since '; are bounded g is bounded, then by the Lemma from (G. Scorza-Dragoni 1935) , the boundary value problem
has at least one solution
We can proceed exactly the same way as in the proof of Lemma 1 and 4 to show that 0 < J A (z) ; J B (z) < P and 0 < J
A is also the solution to the original system.
In order to prove uniqueness, we use theorem XII-4.3 8 from (Hartman 1964, pg. 425 ).
8 Theorem XII-4.3 (Hartman 1964 , pg 425 )Let f (t; x; x 0 ) be continuous for 0 t p and for (x; x 0 ) on some 2d-dimensional convex set. Let f (t; x; x 0 ) have continuous partial derivatives with respect to the components of x and x 0 . Let the Jacobian matrices of f with respect to x,x 0 B (t; x; x 0 ) = @ x f (t; x; x 0 )
Proof of Theorem 2. In order to apply the Theorem XII -4.3 (Hartman 1964, pg. 425) , we need to verify the condition
Together with (Bs) :s 2 minfr A ;r B g 2 ksk 2 , we have (10) implies (16). Proof of Lemma 2. First we show that, whenever x A (z) = x B (z) = x, we have
Indeed, we have
for all constant vectors z 6 = 0. Then the boundary value problem
has at most one solution.
So (17) at z = z implies that x 0 A (z ) > x B (z ). As a result, there exists an > 0 such that x A (z) > x B (z) over (z ; z + ). We prove the lemma by contradiction. Suppose that there exists an z > z + such that x A (z) x B (z). Let z be the in…mum of these z's, we have
. This contradicts the fact that z is the in…mum. So
Proof of Proposition 1. 1) We rewrite equation (4) for B:
Given that x A (z) > x B (z) and J 
Di¤erentiate with respect to z
Part 2) implies that x Proof of Lemma 3. Given that the upper bound x is not binding in equilibrium, (5) implies a linear relationship between e¤orts and slopes of the payo¤ functions:
As a result (9) simpli…es to
We can see immediately that this system of equations and the boundary conditions are equivalent to the ones resulting from the game with 
We derive the boundary conditions for (21) using Lebnitz's rule:
We can rewrite these conditions using the strategies function x and y:
Let us de…ne the function g as g = x y ;
g is well-de…ned since y > 0. We will …nd an explicit relationship between g and y.
From the de…nition of g we have:
x 0 (z) = g 0 (y) y 0 (z) y (z) + g (y) y 0 (z) : so g 0 (y) y = g (y) 1 + g (y) 1 2g (y) :
Rewrite this in a di¤erential form:
dg ( 
where C 1 > 0 is a constant pinned down by the boundary conditions. So, combining (23) and (24) yields the strategy functions (12) in the text. Now with these expressions, we determine g as a function of z. Di¤erentiate the expression for x from (12) with respect to z implies x 0 = g 0 C 1 (2 (g + 1) 3g) g (g + 1)
Plugging this expression for x 0 into (21) and simplifying give
or equivalently
+ 2 ln (g (z)) + g (z) = C 1 dz:
So we obtain …nally
+ 2 ln g (z) = C 1 z + C 2 :
Again, the constant C 2 is pinned down by the boundary conditions. We come back to write equations determining C 1 and C 2 using (22): The previous closed-form yields
2 (g (z) + 1) 3 dz
Using the change of variable z = z (g) and the di¤erential form (25). The integral on x becomes
These equations give a system of equations on g (K A ) and g (K B )
We can then solve for g (K A ) and g (K B ) explicitly in functions of K A ; K B ; P A ; P B g (K A ) = exp (P A + P B ) exp (P B ) exp (P B ) 1 ;
and g (K B ) = exp (P A ) 1 exp (P A + P B ) exp (P A ) :
Together with the two equations (26) on g at z = K B and K A ; C 1 and C 2 are then 
